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during World War II
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I. Introduction
In Summer, 1943, the Cornell Law Quarterly published an article that began 
with this comment on the Japanese internment:
On January 9, 1942, the President of the United States issued a statement: 
“Remember the Nazi technique: ‘pit race against race, religion against 
religion, prejudice against prejudice. Divide and conquer.’ We must not let 
that happen here.” Yet within ninety days after those words were spoken we 
had evacuated 112,000 persons of Japanese ancestry, of whom 79,000 were 
American citizens, from five states on the west coast.1
This critique sounds a now familiar refrain—the grim irony that Americans 
would resort to Nazi-style policies in a misguided attempt to protect their 
homeland, even while fighting the Nazi war machine abroad. What is more 
surprising about the critique is its author—Harrop Freeman, who published 
the article during a two-year stint as a visiting, untenured, professor at William 
and Mary Law School. It was the first academic publication of his career.
Two more law professors publicly voiced criticism of the internment 
during the war. Edwin Borchard, a tenured professor at Yale Law School, 
signed on to the amicus briefs for two of the Supreme Court cases spawned 
1. Harrop A. Freeman, Genesis, Exodus, and Leviticus: Genealogy, Evacuation, and Law, 28 
Cornell L. Q. 414, 414–15 (1943).
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by the internment.2 More famously, Yale Law professor Eugene Rostow—
newly tenured and recently returned from two years of government service—
published a scholarly article denouncing the Supreme Court opinions in the 
internment cases in June, 1945, calling them and the internment program a 
“disaster” for civil liberties.3 By this time, however, Rostow’s critique was cold 
comfort for those interned; the government had rescinded the internment 
order the day before the decisions in Korematsu v. United States and Ex Parte Endo,4 
and the internees were already in the process of leaving the camps.
Given the modern notoriety accorded to the internment program, the 
silence of legal scholars on the topic during World War II is remarkable. But a 
quick survey of some of the most controversial government policies during the 
war shows that few law professors commented critically—or even uncritically—
about the government’s domestic policies during the war. For the most part, 
legal academics kept quiet about events such as the secret trial of the German 
saboteurs, the “Great Sedition Trial” of American fascists, and the federal 
government’s failure to protect Jehovah’s Witnesses from state and local 
persecution; they even kept quiet about massive economic programs such as 
2. Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union, Amicus Curiae, Korematsu v. United States, 
323 U.S. 214 (1944) (no. 22); Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union, Amicus Curiae, 
Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944) (no. 70). Thomas Raeburn White, the president of the 
American Law Institute and former dean of the law school at the University of Pennsylvania, 
also signed on to the ACLU’s amicus briefs.
3. Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases—A Disaster, 54 Yale L. J. 489 (1945). Also 
during the war, Nanette Dembitz, an assistant to Ed Ennis at the Department of Justice, 
published an article critical of the internment cases. Nanette Dembitz, Racial Discrimination 
and the Military Judgment: The Supreme Court’s Korematsu and Endo Decisions, 45 
Colum. L. Rev. 175 (1945); Samuel Walker, In Defense of American Liberties: A History 
of the ACLU 148 (2d ed., Southern Illinois Univ. Press 1999) (noting that Dembitz was 
Ennis’s assistant). Two professors of political science published on the topic in law journals, 
one critical and one supportive. See Charles Fairman, The Law of Martial Rule and the 
National Emergency, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 1253, 1301–03 (1942) (professor of political science at 
Stanford, supporting internment); Robert E. Cushman, Some Constitutional Problems of 
Civil Liberty, 23 B.U. L. Rev. 335, 362, 377–78 (1943) (professor of government at Cornell, 
criticizing internment). In addition, several law journals published notes and comments, 
one supportive of the internment, two critical, and two neutral reports on the Hirabayashi 
decision. See Roald Hogenson, Note, 11 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 482, 504 (1943) (supportive); 
Richard F. Wolfson, Legal Doctrine, War Power and Japanese Evacuation, 32 Ky. L. J. 
328 (1944) (critical); Comment, Alien Enemies and Japanese-Americans: A Problem of 
Wartime Controls, 51 Yale L. J. 1316, 1330–38 (1942) (critical); Note, 17 Tul. L. Rev. 652 (1943) 
(neutral summary of Hirabayashi); Recent Decision, 41 Mich. L. Rev. 522 (1943) (mostly 
neutral summary of Hirabayashi). Finally, three more law journals published articles by 
lawyers in the employment of the federal government justifying the internment. See Maurice 
Alexandre, The Nisei—A Casualty of World War II, 28 Cornell L. Q. 385 (1943) (lawyer for 
Office of Price Administration); W. A. Graham, Martial Law in California, 31 Cal. L. Rev. 
6 (1942) (JAG officer); Joel F. Watson, The Japanese Evacuation and Litigation Arising 
Therefrom, 22 Or. L. Rev. 46 (1942) (JAG officer).
4. Opinions in both cases were released on Dec. 18, 1944. Korematsu v. United States, 323 
U.S. 214 (1944); Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944). On Dec. 17, 1944, the War Department 
had announced the revocation of the exclusion orders that had resulted in the internment. 
Public Proclamation No. 21, 10 Fed. Reg. 53 (1945) (effective Jan. 2, 1945).
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Lend-Lease or the Office of Price Administration. What explains this silence? 
And what explains the rare courage shown by the few scholars who chose to 
speak?
The silence of the legal academy during World War II is even more 
startling when compared with the outspoken response of legal scholars to 
the current war on terror. As Peter Margulies, Joseph Margulies, and Hope 
Metcalf demonstrate their articles in this issue, the legal academy has seized 
upon the issue, writing hundreds of law review articles about the war in 
scholarly journals, establishing national securities clinics at law schools, and 
participating in litigation involving the Guantánamo detainees, both at the 
level of assisting detainees in their hearings before military tribunals and in 
writing amicus briefs to the Supreme Court. Law professors also have employed 
popular media to trumpet their opinions, appearing as expert commentators 
on television, writing op-eds in newspapers, blogging, and testifying before 
Congress on topics such as the treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib and 
Guantánamo, or the National Security Agency’s warrantless wiretap program. 
The contemporary legal academy seems to have embraced a very public role 
as government watchdog, and the academic and popular media have provided 
a willing outlet for the publication of academic opinions on the current war.
While there were fewer types of media available to scholars in the early 20th 
century, law professors were not hampered by a lack of media outlets willing to 
publish their opinions, or a culture of scholarly noninvolvement. In the decade 
prior to World War II, a number of law professors had functioned as public 
intellectuals—that is, had participated in the public debate on contemporary 
issues using the mass media. Most famously, Felix Frankfurter, while a Harvard 
Law School professor, served on the board of the New Republic and contributed 
numerous articles and letters to that magazine, The Nation, and the New York 
Times.5 Frankfurter wrote on topics ranging from presidential candidates to the 
League of Nations to judicial misconduct;6 he published a scathing critique 
of the behavior of the judge who presided over the Sacco and Vanzetti trial 
in The Atlantic Monthly.7 Other professors who regularly published comments on 
current events in popular media included Borchard, Dean Lloyd K. Garrison 
of the Wisconsin Law School, Alexander Sack of New York University, and 
Thomas Reed Powell and E. Merrick Dodd of Harvard Law School.8
5. See Clyde E. Jacobs, Justice Frankfurter and Civil Liberties 1 (Univ. of California Publications 
in Political Science 1974) (noting that “no justice at the time of his appointments was as well 
known through both the popular press and the law journals for persistent but responsible 
criticism of the Court and its decisions”).
6. See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, The I.R.T. Receivership: Criticism of Judge Manton’s Course by 
a Law Professor, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1932, at 18; Felix Frankfurter, Why I Am for Smith, 
The New Republic, Oct. 31, 1928, at 292; Felix Frankfurter, Joining the League, The Nation, 
May 16, 1923, at 571.
7. Felix Frankfurter, The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti, The Atlantic Monthly 409–32 (1927).
8. See, e.g., Edwin Borchard, The Treaty with Italy; Broadening of Our Embargo on Shipments 
Viewed as a Violation, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1935, at 22; E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Full Aid 
to Russia Favored; Interpretation of Lease-Lend Law by Hoover Group Criticized, N.Y. 
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Nor were scholarly journals averse to publishing critical articles on current 
(and sometimes controversial) topics. The Columbia Law Review, in the interwar 
period, published articles criticizing the abusive use of labor injunctions and 
recent efforts at reform, questioning the rationale of recent decisions declaring 
minimum wage laws unconstitutional, and vigorously defending the National 
Labor Relations Board.9 The Michigan Law Review published articles questioning 
the legal basis of America’s failure to recognize the Soviet government, 
lamenting the current state of the law on congressional redistricting, and 
arguing for the use of sociological data in litigation against racial segregation 
in housing.10 The American Journal of International Law—with Borchard on its 
board of editors from 1924 onward—routinely published timely commentary 
on international events, including Borchard’s harsh critiques of American 
foreign policy.11
Finally, several professors participated in litigation involving civil rights 
issues prior to World War II. Walter Gellhorn and Herbert Wechsler, as 
young professors at Columbia Law School, signed on to the appellant’s brief 
in Herndon v. Lowry, arguing that a state insurrection law should be declared 
unconstitutional.12 Dean Garrison lent his prestige to amicus briefs in Lovell v. 
Griffin and Minersville v. Gobitis,13 while George Gardner and Zechariah Chafee, 
professors at Harvard, authored both amicus briefs filed on behalf of the 
Times, Aug. 12, 1941, at 18; Lloyd K. Garrison, Little Fault Found in Labor Act; Wisconsin 
University Dean Believes Measure Should Have Further Trial Before Changes Are Made, 
N.Y. Times, April 9, 1939, at E8; Thomas Reed Powell, For “Ills” of the Court: Shall We 
Operate?, N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1937, at 3; Alexander Sack, see infra note 82.
9. Felix Frankfurter & Nathan Greene, Congressional Power over the Labor Injunction, 
30 Colum. L. Rev. 385 (1931); Robert L. Hale, The Constitution and Minimum Wages, 
36 Colum. L. Rev. 629 (1936); Walter Gellhorn & Seymour Linfield, Politics and Labor 
Relations: An Appraisal of Criticisms of NLRB Procedure, 39 Colum. L. Rev. 339 (1939).
10. Edwin D. Dickinson, Recognition of Russia, 30 Mich. L. Rev. 181 (1931); Harold M. 
Bowman, Congressional Redistricting and the Constitution, 31 Mich. L. Rev. 149 (1932); 
Arthur T. Martin, Segregation of Residences of Negroes, 32 Mich. L. Rev. 721 (1934).
11. See, e.g., Edwin Borchard, Neutral Embargoes and Commercial Treaties, 30 Am. J. Int’l L. 
501, 505 (1936) (criticizing the recently announced expansive interpretation of goods subject 
to embargo as “unwise and unsound”).
12. Brief for the Appellant, Herndon v. Lowry, 101 U.S. 242 (1937) (nos. 474 & 475) (signed 
by Whitney North Seymour and W.A. Sutherland, Herbert T. Wechsler, Walter Gellhorn, 
and Carol King, of counsel). Wechsler and Gellhorn were also “of counsel” on the briefs in 
Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441 (1934) (no. 665).
13. Brief and Motion on behalf of American Civil Liberties Union, as Amicus Curiae, Lovell 
v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1937) (no. 391) (arguing that a city ordinance requiring a permit for 
leafleting is unconstitutional); Brief for American Civil Liberties Union, Amicus Curiae, 
Minersville v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (no. 690); Brief of the Committee on the Bill of 
Rights, of the American Bar Association, as Friends of the Court, Minersville v. Gobitis, 310 
U.S. 586 (1940) (no. 690) (arguing that compulsory flag salutes for children in the public 
schools are unconstitutional).
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Gobitis family.14 Frankfurter and Chafee also had filed amicus briefs on behalf 
of twenty aliens slated for deportation due to their political beliefs.15
Thus, a cursory glance at the culture of the legal academy in the interwar 
period16 shows there was room in the academy for professors who were 
outspoken critics of government, for professors who wanted to educate the 
public—or debate with others—about the legal issues of the day, and for 
professors who wanted to litigate to protect civil liberties. And so the culture 
of non-engagement with government policies during the war years seems like 
a departure from the relatively open discourse that prevailed within the legal 
academy in the interwar years.
This Article examines published commentary on the government’s domestic 
policy during World War II by legal academics and explains their behavior at 
the time—specifically, their choices to speak or remain silent about government 
policy during war.
Part II argues that the legal academy’s silence about government policies 
during World War II was caused by myriad historical factors. The most 
important of these may have been the economic strain of the war on law 
schools, which forced almost half of full-time law professors to take leaves of 
absence from their schools and find other employment—most often with the 
federal government, in the very departments that had ordered the internment 
of Japanese-Americans or brought indictments against American fascists. 
Second, law schools only recently had made a formal commitment to academic 
freedom and tenure when World War II began. The new, untested commitment 
of many law schools to these ideals reinforced the academy’s perception of job 
insecurity. Third, civil rights jurisprudence—including the defensive use of the 
First Amendment—was in an early stage of development in the 1940s. There 
were some academics who strongly and publicly supported civil rights, but it is 
unclear that support for civil rights in the legal academy was especially strong 
or deep. Nor is it clear that many professors viewed themselves as government 
watchdogs or advocates who should participate in ground-breaking litigation. 
Even if academics were inclined to support civil rights causes, they might have 
been willing to temper their criticism for the sake of supporting the war effort; 
after all, World War II was a war against fascism and, thus, was supported by 
the very groups who championed civil rights.
Part III focuses on the few scholars who spoke out during the war: one 
who lost his tenured position after commenting favorably about America’s 
alliance with Soviet Russia, and others who wrote about or worked against 
various violations of civil liberties that took place during World War II—the 
14. Brief for American Civil Liberties Union, Amicus Curiae, Minersville v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 
586 (1940) (no. 690); Brief of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, of the American Bar 
Association, as Friends of the Court, Minersville v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (no. 690); see 
infra text accompanying notes 159–162.
15. Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 F. 17 (D.C. Mass. 1920).
16. A more thorough analysis is outside the scope of this paper.
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internment of Japanese-Americans, the sedition trial of the American Nazis, 
and the persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses. Part III also examines how and 
why these scholars participated in or commented upon current events, and the 
institutional responses and consequences of their involvement.
If the tone of the article seems critical of the legal academy in places, I want 
to emphasize my awareness that the circumstances of World War II imposed 
grave hardships on civil society. As noted by historians, when the existence of 
the country is endangered, and hostile nations are killing “our boys,” military 
victory becomes a priority to which other social goals often bend.17 The universal 
draft took a dramatic financial toll on universities; enrollment diminished, 
and with it, the money to pay faculty to conduct classes. It made sense for 
law professors to seek war-time employment in the federal government: They 
were in the business of training graduates to become public servants, and were 
themselves often experts in public agencies and administration who already 
advised the government on policy. Thus, the departure of many professors for 
service to the state during war was not simply a matter of economic necessity; 
it also was a logical result of their expertise and training and an enactment 
(instantiation) of their exhortations to their students.
But the war also forced law professors to choose whether to give up their 
critical independence—the newly adopted notion of academic freedom that 
may have seemed like a peace time luxury. Most professors no doubt chose 
to subsume their qualms—or even their opinions—about war-time policies to 
their sincerely held desire for a speedy and victorious outcome to the war. And 
given the overwhelming social support for the war, this may not have felt like 
a choice. Some, however, took the remarkable step of maintaining their voice 
during the war. This Article is about those voices.
II. Historical Context
A. Institutions Under Economic Pressure
The most important reason for the silence of the legal academy during 
World War II was probably the economic fragility of law schools and the high 
percentage of legal scholars who found employ with the government that they 
might otherwise have criticized. The Selective Service Act of 1941 made all 
men between the ages of 18 and 45 liable for military service. The effect on law 
school enrollments—and the finances of law schools—was devastating. In 1940, 
the 95 member schools of the Association of American Law Schools (AALS) 
17. See Letter from William E. Leuchtenberg to Sarah H. Ludington (Jan. 10, 2009) (noting that 
a likely reason for law professors to remain silent was that “large numbers of the young were 
being killed by Japanese and by the armies of the European fascists.”); Carol S. Gruber, 
Mars and Minerva: World War I and the Uses of Higher Learning in America 5 (Louisiana 
State Univ. Press 1975) (discussing support among academics for World War I).
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reported enrolling 18,011 students in total. By 1942, that number was down to 
6,227, and by 1943, enrollment reached its nadir, at 3,663—a drop of 80 percent 
from 1940.18
The schools coped with tumbling enrollments in various ways. Six law 
schools became inactive; Duke and Wake Forest combined their law schools;19 
many schools enrolled proportionally more women.20 The most common 
financial strategy was for schools to put full-time professors on leave so that 
they could fulfill their military obligation or find employment elsewhere until 
the war’s end or when a rebound in enrollment would allow schools to rehire 
them.
In 1943, the AALS published statistics on how many professors remained 
employed by the member schools. Before the war, AALS member schools 
reported employing 715 full- and 394 part-time faculty. By 1943, the schools 
reported employing 367 full- and 229 part-time faculty—barely more than 
half of the numbers employed before the war.21 A survey of member schools 
revealed that, of the 320 faculty listed as being on a “leave of absence,” 257 of 
them—80 percent—had taken a job with a federal paycheck. A good number of 
these professors were on active duty in the armed forces. Others took positions 
in war-related agencies, such as the Office of Price Administration, the Lend-
Lease Administration, or the Office of Economic Warfare. Still others worked 
for federal agencies such as the Department of Justice or the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation.22
18. Statistical Information on Enrollment, 1944 AALS Proc., 105 (1944).
19. Loyola University of Chicago, Mercer, St. Louis University, Santa Clara, Stetson, and 
Wyoming were inactive. Statistical Information on Faculties, Faculty Members on Duty in 
Member Schools, 1943 AALS Proc. 79–80 (1943).
20. The total number of female students did not increase significantly. In 1940, 716 women 
were enrolled; in 1942, 769; in 1943, 814. Because of the decrease in male students, however, 
women made up a greater proportion of the total student population: in 1940, 4 percent; in 
1942, 12 percent; in 1943, 22 percent. Statistical Information on Enrollment, supra note 18, at 
105.
21. Statistical Information on Faculties, supra note 19. The year 1943 was the nadir of employment 
and enrollment for law schools. In 1944, enrollment began to climb again as veterans 
returning from the war enrolled.
22. Law professors were in such demand by the federal government that a law school in the 
position to hire faculty found it difficult to find qualified candidates. James Miller, the dean 
of Faculty at William and Mary, discovered an “unexpected and very grave manpower 
shortage” when he was searching for a law professor in the fall of 1942: “Nearly everybody 
who was qualified for the temporary position at William and Mary was secure in his own 
position in a law school or had accepted a lucrative appointment in Washington or in 
some regional P.P.A. office or had joined the armed forces.” This shortage forced William 
and Mary to consider the candidacy of Harrop Freeman, who was qualified but had never 
previously taught, and had the political disadvantage of being a conscientious objector. 
Letter from James Wilkinson Miller, Dean of Faculty, to J. Gordon Bohannan, Rector of 
the Board of Visitors (Oct. 2, 1944); Facts Concerning Professor Harrop Freeman and Dr. 
Roderick Firth: A Summary of the Statement made by Dean James Wilkinson Miller to the 
Special Committee of the Board on June 4, 1944; see infra text accompanying notes 126–135.
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Of the 367 faculty who remained as full-time employees of law schools, 93, 
or 25 percent, reported also working for a federal agency, such as the local 
selective service board. For example, seven of Columbia’s fifteen full-time 
faculty reported also working for various federal entities. The additional 
employment of these full-time faculty may have allowed the school to reduce 
the professors’ salaries, easing the school’s financial burden.
The high number of law professors who found employment with the federal 
government during the war seems to have had a profound effect on their 
inclination to comment critically on government policies, and it should be 
clear why this would be so for those in active military service or federal employ. 
First, as public employees, the lawyers had no recourse to a First Amendment 
defense if fired for criticizing their employer.23 Second, such criticism might 
have been viewed as a breach of the duty of loyalty, and thus a breach of 
a lawyer’s ethical duties to his client. Herbert Wechsler, on leave from his 
position at Columbia Law School, worked as an assistant attorney general 
during World War II and helped write the government’s brief in Korematsu. 
Wechsler later admitted that he had been “deeply disturbed” by the evacuation 
but at the time had “put aside his personal feelings and performed his duty 
as a lawyer.”24 While this comment has been criticized for being self-serving,25 
it illustrates that the duty of loyalty would have functioned as a powerful 
inhibitor to dissent for academics temporarily or even partly employed by the 
federal government.26
Other factors increased the pressure on public employees not to criticize the 
government. The Dies Committee was still active during World War II, and 
in the early years of the war, it pressured the government into investigating 
thousands of federal employees for previous affiliations with left-leaning 
groups.27 At the end of the investigation, a congressional committee found 
three federal employees—two of them former academics serving in government 
positions28—to be subversive and unfit for federal employment. Over the 
23. See infra text accompanying notes 62–65.
24. Peter Irons, Justice at War: The Story of Japanese-American Internment Cases 357–58 (Univ. 
of California Press 1993).
25. See, e.g., Malick W. Ghachem & Daniel Gordon, From Emergency Law to Legal Process: 
Herbert Wechsler and the Second World War, 40 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 333, 359–60 (2007).
26. Other government employees were not as complicit as Wechsler. Edward Ennis, the director 
of the Alien Enemy Control Unit and the person in charge of the internment, parole, and 
repatriation of enemy aliens, also was deeply opposed to the internment of Japanese-
Americans. He reputedly coached the ACLU on how to argue internment cases before the 
Supreme Court. Walker, supra note 3, at 146–47. His assistant, Nanette Dembitz, published a 
long article critical of the internment cases in 1945. Dembitz, supra note 3.
27. Robert Justin Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America: From 1870 to 1976 277–79 
(Univ. of Illinois Press 2001). The Hatch Act prohibited the expenditure of federal funds on 
the salaries of anyone who had advocated the violent overthrow of government, so public 
employees who had previously been members of the Communist Party could lose their jobs.
28. Goodwin Watson had been a professor of psychology at Columbia University; Robert 
Morss Lovett had been a professor of literature at the University of Chicago.
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objection of the agencies who employed them, Congress passed a law cutting 
off the salaries of the employees.29 Furthermore, the Civil Service Commission 
actively investigated prospective employees for “loyalty” and failed to certify 
1,300 applicants for jobs on these grounds during the war period.30
Several academics who took temporary war-related positions with the 
government published articles explaining, defending, or promoting the 
agency or program that employed them. Dean Wayne L. Morse of the Oregon 
Law School took a leave of absence in 1942 to serve as a public representative 
on the National War Labor Board. Later that year, Morse published a long 
law review article entitled “The National War Labor Board, its Powers and 
Duties,” that justified the Board as a valid exercise of executive power during 
war time, explained and lauded its “democratic” procedures, and surveyed 
and defended its various decisions.31 Similarly, Eugene Rostow, while on 
leave from Yale and working for the State Department and the Lend-Lease 
Administration, published an article explaining how the lend-lease program 
served two beneficial economic purposes.32
Meanwhile Dean Landis of the Harvard Law School, in one of his 
numerous appointments under Roosevelt, became the director of the regional 
and later the national Office of Civilian Defense (OCD).33 Landis—an expert 
in administrative law and the architect of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission—began cheerleading for civilian morale and mobilization, 
publishing three articles in the New York Times justifying the frequency of air 
raid drills and extolling the “total mobilization” of the American people.34 
In 1941, he published an article on civilian morale in the American Journal of 
Sociology, arguing (among other things) that “Dissenters of every political or 
doctrinal persuasion must be reminded that there is a time for debate and a 
time for united action, and that full collaboration with other nations for the 
purpose of securing the defeat of Nazi Germany is now a public policy which 
29. The U.S. Supreme Court later invalidated the act as an unconstitutional bill of attainder and 
awarded the men back pay. U.S. v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
30. Goldstein, supra note 27, at 278 & n.186.
31. See generally Wayne L. Morse, The National War Labor Board, its Powers and Duties, Or. 
L. Rev. 1, 1–45 (1942). Morse also defended the Board in the Los Angeles Times: Wayne L. 
Morse, Letters to The Times—In Which Dean Morse Replies, L.A. Times, July 27, 1942, at 
A4.
32. Eugene V. Rostow, Two Aspects of Lend-Lease Economics, 33 Am. Econ. Rev. 377, 377–81 
(1943).
33. Landis was appointed regional director in 1941 and national director in 1942, requiring him 
to take a leave of absence from Harvard. AALS Directory of Law Teachers, 1942–43 117.
34. James M. Landis, Civilian Defense Necessary; National Director Explains Need for 
Frequent Air Raid Drills, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1943, at 21; James M. Landis, Letter—Air 
Raid Signals Approved; Conditions Here Held To Make Present System Appropriate, N.Y. 
Times, May 22, 1943, at 12; James M. Landis, Two Years of OCD; Civilian Defense, says the 
director, has come to mean the total mobilization of the people, N.Y. Times, May 30, 1943, 
at 10.
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it is the duty of every American citizen to support.”35 This position may have 
seemed incongruous from a man who, two years earlier, had been appointed 
to investigate the deportation of Harry Bridges, and—in the teeth of political 
pressure from the Dies Committee—had submitted a report absolving Bridges 
of any communist affiliation.36 On the other hand, Landis was not alone in 
believing that free speech and dissent were peace time luxuries to be set aside 
for the sake of winning the war.37
The authorship of law review articles during the war also reflects the paucity 
of law professors within the academy. Law reviews continued publishing 
commentary on domestic policy, but the articles mostly were written by 
practicing attorneys or authors outside the legal academy. For example, the 
California Law Review published five articles on martial law in the early years 
of the war, written by the attorney general of Hawaii and two colonels.38 The 
only professor to contribute an article wrote a comparative historical analysis, 
contrasting the French model of martial law with the harsher Anglo-American 
model.39 The Cornell Law Quarterly published numerous articles on war policy, 
on topics such as war-time price controls, federal emergency taxation, the 
powers of the alien property custodian, and the trial of the Nazi saboteurs. 
Almost without exception, these timely pieces were written by practicing 
attorneys or professors in fields other than law.40 Whether professors were 
too overwhelmed by their teaching duties to write, or deliberately sticking to 
esoteric topics, or absent from the profession and thus from the compulsion to 
publish, is impossible to tell.
In sum, while many factors contributed to a climate hostile to speech critical 
of the government, the most important may have been the war-time economics 
that had depleted by half the ranks of legal academics who claimed full-time 
jobs in the academy.
35. James M. Landis, Morale and Civilian Defense, 47 Am. J. Sociology 331, 339 (1941).
36. Richard W. Steele, Free Speech in the Good War 101–02 (Palgrave Macmillan 1999); Landis 
Absolves Bridges of Charge of Red Affiliation, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1939, at 1.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 68-69.
38. Garner Anthony, Martial Law, Military Government, and the Writ of Habeas Corpus 
in Hawaii, 31 Cal. L. Rev. 477 (1943) (Attorney General, territory of Hawaii); Col. W.A. 
Graham, Martial Law in California, 31 Cal. L. Rev. 6 (1942) (Judge Advocate, U.S. Army, 
retired); Garner Anthony, Martial Law in Hawaii, 30 Cal. L. Rev. 371 (1942) (written while 
Anthony was in private practice); Archibald King, Legality of Martial Law in Hawaii, 30 
Cal. L. Rev. 599 (1942) (Colonel, Judge Advocate General’s Section, U.S. Army).
39. Max Radin, Martial Law and the State of Seige, 30 Cal. L. Rev. 634 (1942).
40. See, e.g., John Foster Dulles, The Vesting Powers of the Alien Property Custodian, 28 Cornell 
L.Q. 245 (1943) (practicing attorney); Robert E. Cushman, Ex Parte Quirin et al., The Nazi 
Saboteur Case, 28 Cornell L.Q. 54 (1942) (professor of government); Randolph E. Paul, The 
Emergency Job of Federal Taxation, 27 Cornell L.Q. 3 (1941) (practicing attorney); Paul F. 
Hannah, Some Aspects of Price Control in Wartime, 27 Cornell. L.Q. 21 (1941) (practicing 
attorney). The exception was Freeman’s article about the internment, supra note 1.
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B. Insecure Tenure
Reinforcing the climate of job insecurity, law schools had only recently 
committed themselves to the ideals of academic freedom and tenure. In 1940—
one year before the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor—the AALS for the first 
time adopted a statement on academic freedom and tenure. Previously, the 
articles of the AALS contained no statement on either subject.
It was not until 1934 that the AALS (founded in 1900) formed a Committee 
on Tenure to consider adopting a formal position on tenure.41 The committee 
initially recommended making no changes to the AALS articles, and relying 
instead on the general requirement in Article Six, Section Nine that member 
schools must conduct themselves in accordance with “sound educational 
policy,” which presumably included a commitment to academic freedom.42 
The AALS members rejected this suggestion.
The Committee on Tenure went back to work and in 1940 recommended 
that the AALS adopt, with minor amendments, the most current statement 
on academic freedom and tenure of the American Association of University 
Professors (AAUP).43 The AALS adopted the committee’s report, with some 
debate over whether the principles in the statement on academic freedom and 
tenure would be mandatory or advisory for member schools. The following 
year, the AALS adopted an interpretation of Article Six, Section Nine that 
clarified that failure to uphold the principles of academic freedom and tenure 
could result in exclusion from the association.44
Because membership in the AALS was now conditioned on upholding 
the principles of the 1940 statement, the AALS effectively committed itself 
to investigating schools that violated the principles of academic freedom and 
tenure. Law professors who were dismissed from their jobs in violation of 
the statement could now appeal to the AALS, which would investigate and 
attempt to mediate the dispute.45 As a practical matter, however, the AALS 
had little leverage over the schools, and short of publishing the results of its 
investigation or revoking membership for the school, could hope to do little 
more than negotiate a better severance package for the departing faculty.46
41. AALS Proceedings 231 (1940).
42. AALS Proceedings 137, 233–36 (1940).
43. Id. The AALS adopted a draft version of what later became the 1940 statement. The most 
significant difference between the draft adopted by the AALS, and the final statement 
adopted by the AAUP, was a probationary period of seven rather than six years. The AALS 
changed its tenure period to match the one in the final AAUP statement in 1941. Report of 
the Committee on Tenure, AALS Proceedings 195–97 (1946).
44. Association Standards as to Tenure, AALS Proceedings 40–44 (1941); Report of the 
Committee on Tenure, AALS Proceedings 297–99 (1941).
45. See Report of the Committee on Tenure, AALS Proceedings 130–31 (1942) (noting that 
the work of the Committee on Tenure was now primarily one of answering broad policy 
questions about tenure and investigating reported abuses); AALS Proceedings 91 (1941) 
(same).
46. See, e.g., Letter from Professor Everett Fraser, President, AALS, to Professor Erwin N. 
The Silence of the Legal Academy during World War II
408	 Journal of Legal Education
Unlike the AALS, the AAUP had overtly committed itself to the principles 
of academic freedom from its founding in 1915. The AAUP’s 1915 statement 
on academic freedom premised the need for academic freedom on the moral 
duty of scholars to seek and disseminate truth for the common good—rather 
than for the benefit of the boards of trustees.47 The innovation of the 1940 
statement was to require member schools to adopt a system of tenure after a 
probationary period.
The 1940 statement begins with the assertion that academic freedom—
freedom in both teaching and research—is essential to the mission of higher 
education, which is the “the free search for truth and its free exposition.” 
It further asserts that tenure is a means for achieving the end of academic 
freedom:
Tenure is a means to certain ends; specifically: (1) freedom of teaching and 
research and of extramural activities, and (2) a sufficient degree of economic 
security to make the profession attractive to men and women of ability. Freedom 
and economic security, hence, tenure, are indispensable to the success of an 
institution in fulfilling its obligations to its students and to society.48
The statement further provided that, after a probationary period not to 
exceed seven years, professors would have “permanent or continuous tenure” 
and could be terminated only for “adequate cause…or under extraordinary 
circumstances because of financial exigencies.”49 In other words, the 1940 
statement asserted that any professor who had been teaching full time for 
seven years held a tenured position could be fired only for misconduct; it also 
provided that teachers should have absolute freedom in their teaching, in their 
research, and in their speech as citizens—i.e., speech critical of the government. 
The 1940 statement was weaker than the one in effect today because of 
a crucial ambiguity that resulted from a compromise between the AAUP 
and the American Association of Colleges (which represents university 
Griswold (Nov. 9, 1945) (opining that “the principles of tenure are principles and not 
contractual rights,” and that the “principles of tenure are respected by universities, not 
because of any contractual obligation, but because of the censure that may result from 
disregard of them”).
47. Matthew W. Finkin & Robert C. Post, For the Common Good: Principles of American 
Academic Freedom 33–38 (Yale Univ. Press 2009); Sheila Slaughter, The Danger Zone: 
Academic Freedom and Civil Liberties, 448 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 48, 48–49 
(1980).
48. 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, American Association 
of University Professors, available at http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/policydocs/
contents/1940statement.htm (hereafter AAUP 1940 Statement).
49. Id.
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administrators), which negotiated with the AAUP to produce the statement.50 
The 1940 statement cautions that professors need to be mindful of their 
“special position” in the community when speaking as citizens:
As scholars and educational officers, they should remember that the public 
may judge their profession and their institution by their utterances. Hence 
they should at all times be accurate, should exercise appropriate restraint, 
should show respect for the opinions of others, and should make every effort 
to indicate that they are not speaking for the institution.51
The 1940 statement thus asks professors to exercise self-restraint (a.k.a. self-
censorship) when speaking publicly on controversial issues.52
Despite issuing “strong” statements on academic freedom and tenure 
(strong for the times), the AAUP had a spotty record in actually condemning 
schools that violated the principles of academic freedom prior to World War 
II. During World War I, the AAUP had strongly supported the war and 
essentially forbade professors from speaking out against it or encouraging 
anyone to resist service.53 At least twenty professors lost their jobs for opposing 
the war; the AAUP did not come to their defense.54 Nor was the AAUP active in 
defending professors during the Great Depression. In 1932, for example, Leo 
Gallagher was forced to resign his faculty position at Southwestern University 
Law School for defending the “Mooney Runners.” The AAUP did not come 
to Gallagher’s defense.55
In sum, on the cusp of World War II, the faculty at an AALS member 
school would not have had encouraging precedent from the AAUP when 
considering how well the newly adopted statement of academic freedom and 
tenure would actually protect their jobs in case of controversy. And they would 
50. Finkin & Post, supra note 47, at 47–48; Slaughter, supra note 47, at 56–57 (arguing that 
professors traded their civil liberties for tenure in the 1940 statement).
51. AAUP 1940 Statement, supra note 48.
52. William Van Alstyne has argued that the standard of accuracy apparently expressed in the 
1940 Statement is “substantially more inhibiting of a faculty member’s freedom of speech 
than any standard that the government is [currently] constitutionally privileged to impose…
[on]…public employees.” Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom and the 
General Issue of Civil Liberties, 404 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 140, 155 (1972). 
The AAUP did not reinterpret this part of the 1940 Statement until 1964, when it issued a 
report stating that “’a faculty member’s expression of opinion as a citizen cannot constitute 
grounds for dismissal unless it clearly demonstrates the faculty member’s unfitness for his 
position.’” Id. (quoting Committee A Statement on Extramural Utterances (1964)).
53. Slaughter, supra note 47, at 52; see also Gruber, supra note 17, at 81–82 (noting the enthusiasm 
of most American professors for the war) and 165–66 (describing the AAUP’s official retreat 
from the 1915 statement on academic freedom at the beginning of World War I).
54. Slaughter, supra note 47, at 53.
55. Slaughter, supra note 47, at 55. Tom Mooney was a labor leader who was convicted 
(controversially) of planning the San Francisco Preparedness Day bombing of 1916. The 
“Mooney Runners” were students who disrupted an event at the 1932 Olympics in Los 
Angeles by running around the track wearing signs that read “FREE TOM MOONEY.”
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have had no precedent whatsoever from the AALS.56 The uncertain state of 
academic freedom and tenure, combined with the financially precarious state 
of law schools during the war, would have reinforced a professor’s perception 
of job insecurity. Under such circumstances, a professor would hardly need 
encouragement to “exercise self restraint” before making controversial public 
statements about government policy.
C. Intellectual Flux and Emerging Legal Doctrines
Another factor that contributed to the silence of legal scholars was the 
inchoate state of First Amendment and civil rights jurisprudence in the 
early 1940s. The period immediately preceding World War II was a time of 
extraordinary doctrinal and intellectual flux, particularly pertaining to the field 
that is now known as civil rights. The legal doctrines that have come to protect 
civil liberties still were emerging in the 1930s and 40s.57 Prior to 1937, when the 
Supreme Court definitively rang the death knell of substantive due process,58 
the concept of civil liberties was, as often as not, associated with conservatism 
and the staunch protection of contract and private property. The Court had 
hinted in 1938 that it would turn its attention to issues of civil liberties and the 
protection of “discrete and insular minorities,”59 but at the beginning of World 
War II, the doctrinal foundations for the legal protection of civil liberties were 
still uncertain.60 In 1940, there was no such thing as a civil rights “field” of 
practice or area of study;61 consequently, it is not at all clear that a sector of 
56. The AALS did not hold annual meetings during World War I, and, in any event, did not 
have a stated position on academic freedom and tenure at this time. Its Committee on 
Tenure did not actually investigate any tenure cases until 1939. AALS Proceedings 138–42 
(1939) (describing a joint investigation of the AALS and the AAUP into the dismissal of 
three law professors at Stetson University).
57. See generally Risa L. Goluboff, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Origins of Civil 
Rights, 50 Duke L.J. 1609 (2001) (tracing the development of modern doctrines of civil 
rights from 1939-54).
58. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
59. U.S. v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
60. Goluboff, supra note 57, at 1612, 1630–34. The ACLU, founded in 1920 in response to the 
political repressions of World War I, had actively litigated civil rights issues between the 
wars, but with only limited success. Walker, supra note 3, at 16–26; Paul L. Murphy, The 
Constitution in Crisis Times 1918–1969 69–71 (HarperCollins College Div. 1972). Ironically, 
the U.S. Supreme Court definitively announced its standard of heightened scrutiny for laws 
involving racial discrimination in the Korematsu opinion in 1944. Korematsu v. U.S., 323 
U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
61. Goluboff, supra note 57, at 1612 (“In fact, at the time, ‘civil rights’ did not refer to a unified, 
coherent category; the content of the term was open, changing, and contradictory, carrying 
resonances of the past as well as of several possible contending futures.”); Paul L. Murphy, 
World War I and the Origin of Civil Liberties in the United States 154 n.35 (W. W. Norton 
& Co. 1979) (noting that the term “civil liberties” came into use just prior to World War I); 
but see Civil Liberties—A Field of Law, 1 Bill Rts. Rev. 7 (1940) (describing civil rights as a 
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the legal academy—or even the bar—had set itself up to be watchdogs of the 
government or eternally vigilant for the suppression of civil liberties.
Significantly, First Amendment “rights” as we know them now also were in 
their doctrinal infancy at the beginning of World War II; this had two important 
consequences for law professors. First, as a practical matter, a professor at a 
public university who was fired based on his speech had no legal recourse to the 
First Amendment.62 Under the then-prevailing doctrine, a citizen surrendered 
his right of free speech when he entered into an employment relationship with 
the government.63 The Supreme Court began rolling back this doctrine in 
the 1950s,64 but the first successful case of a public school teacher suing his 
employer for firing him in violation of his First Amendment rights did not 
occur until 1968.65 Thus, recorded cases of tenure disputes from the 1940s tend 
to concern contractual disputes—whether a school violated the terms of its 
contract with a professor, or whether the school correctly followed its own 
regulations and procedures for dismissing the professor.66 Not many dismissals 
made their way into the courts, and, in those that did, the underlying reasons 
for the adverse employment decision are usually not reported.67
“distinct field of law…emerging and taking its place along with older established fields”); 
Harry Shulman & Herbert A. Fierst, Teaching Civil Liberties in the Law Schools, 1 Bill Rts. 
Rev. 122, 122–27 (1941) (suggesting that Civil Rights should be taught as a special subject in 
law school).
62. See, e.g., Cobb v. Howard Univ., 106 F.2d 860, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (refusing to reinstate law 
professor denied reappointment because he testified before a congressional committee in 
opposition to university appropriations).
63. See, e.g., Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952) (upholding the New York Civil 
Service Law section relating to ineligibility for employment of any person advocating or 
belonging to organizations advocating overthrow of government by force or violence on the 
following grounds: “It is clear that such persons have the right under our law to assemble, 
speak, think and believe as they will…. It is equally clear that they have no right to work for 
the State in the school system on their own terms…. They may work for the school system 
upon the reasonable terms laid down by the proper authorities of New York. If they do not 
choose to work on such terms, they are at liberty to retain their beliefs and associations and 
go elsewhere.”) (citations omitted); see also McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 
517–18 (Mass. 1892) (Holmes, J.) (“The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk 
politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman”).
64. See, e.g., Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); 
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
65. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
66. E.g., State ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938); Cobb v. Howard Univ., 106 F.2d 
860 (D.C. Cir. 1939); State ex rel. Bourgeois v. Bd. of Sup’rs of La. State Univ., 17 So.2d 25 
(La. 1944); Ironside v. Tead, 13 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1939); State ex rel. Keeney v. Ayers, 92 P.2d 306 
(Mont. 1939); Becker v. Barry, 165 Misc. 877, 300 N.Y.S. 1153 (1937).
67. But see Bd. Of Higher Ed. Of City of N.Y. v. Cole, 263 A.D. 777, 31 N.Y.S.2d 176 (N.Y.A.D. 
3 Dept. 1941) (“The grounds given for her removal are that she has ‘failed to teach history 
at college level satisfactorily by reason of her inability to inspire students with intelligent 
interest in their subject and consequent insistence on the performance of onerous mechanical 
tasks;…by reason of her incapacity to see history as a moving pattern and consequent reliance 
on intensive drill in pedestrian memorization of isolated fact, not intelligibly interrelated;…’ 
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Second, while the ideal of free speech generally was supported by the 
intellectual elite in the 1930s, the parameters of this freedom were ill-defined 
and the depth and strength of the support for the idea had not yet been tested.68 
The Supreme Court, for example, had yet to decide a case that exonerated a 
defendant using the Holmes test for sedition (the “clear and present danger” 
test). And as World War II loomed, the expansive notion of free speech came 
under attack from some of the very intellectuals who previously had extolled it. 
A group of “militant” liberals, many of whom had actively opposed American 
involvement in World War I, concluded in the 1930s that free speech and civil 
liberties were not privileges that could be extended to groups—i.e., fascists—
who would destroy the very system of government that created those liberties. 
The Nation, a periodical known for its staunch liberalism, advocated for an 
aggressive defense of American nationalism, intervention in the war against 
fascism, and ultimately, diminished civil liberties for those who stood in the 
way.69
The legal academy also had strongly conflicting attitudes about civil rights, 
rooted in the intellectual ferment of the previous two decades. The 1920s and 
30s saw the rise of legal realism, which challenged prior “classical” modes 
of thinking about law, and in particular had weakened the classical notions 
of private rights.70 But legal realism also came under attack with the rise of 
fascism in Europe, as the logical implications of realism “undermined the 
concept of a rationally knowable moral standard,” and thus undermined any 
rational critique of Nazi atrocities and totalitarian statism.71 As legal scholars 
came under increasing attack for being relativists and anti-democratic, they 
retreated from the extremes of legal realism. Roscoe Pound famously turned 
on realism in the 1930s, calling it a “give-it-up” philosophy that “leads logically 
to absolutism.”72
Further complicating matters were the sometimes contradictory attitudes 
taken by civil libertarians and legal realists—groups who might otherwise be 
aligned as liberals. ACLU-style liberals tended to focus on the “negative” 
liberties of the individual and were skeptical of the state, even when it was 
and ‘by reason of her ineptitude in efforts to utilize students’ individual backgrounds in 
relation to the general plan of the course and consequent harassing of students without 
laying the necessary foundation for subsequent courses in history.’”).
68. Steele, supra note 36, at 69.
69. Steele, supra note 36, at 69–71; see also Geoffrey Perret, Days of Sadness, Years of Triumph: 
The American People 1939–45 95, 99–101 (Coward, McCann & Geoghegan 1973) (noting the 
liberal turn to militarism during World War II).
70. Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in The Politics of Law: A 
Progressive Critique 32–36 (David Kairys ed., Pantheon 1998).
71. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scientific Naturalism & the 
Problem of Value 172 (Univ. Press of Kentucky 1973).
72. Roscoe Pound, Contemporary Juristic Theory 36–38 (Claremont Colleges 1940).
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engaged in progressive activity.73 But legal realism, which essentially was a 
continuation of early-20th century Progressivism,74 took a more positive view 
of the state. Realists were more likely to believe in the power of a properly run 
state to provide for the welfare of the populace, and generally favored the New 
Deal and a strong executive with almost unfettered discretion to enact reforms 
and manage the economy.75
World War II began in the midst of this intellectual and doctrinal ferment. 
Thus, as difficult as it is to generalize about the opinions of any groups, it is 
exceptionally difficult to generalize about the opinions of the legal academy 
during this time period because of the shifting attitudes at play. To the extent 
that a professor identified with the progressive movement, the legal realists, 
or the New Deal, that professor may have been unwilling to criticize the 
government’s conduct of the war—either because he had faith in the state, was 
a supporter of Roosevelt, or feared to appear anti-democratic or pro-fascist. To 
the extent that a professor identified with civil libertarians, he might have been 
more willing to speak up against the perceived abuses of the war-time state. 
Finally, to the extent that a professor adhered to classical legal notions such as 
the sanctity of contract and private property, he also might have been willing 
to speak with the civil libertarians against the perceived abuses of a state run 
by a powerful executive.76
Finally, it bears repeating that World War II was a popular war, with the 
nation’s fervor stoked against the Japanese in particular, due to the fatal attack 
on Pearl Harbor and how it so surprised and shocked Americans. Three days 
after that bombing, a poll revealed that 96 percent of the nation approved of 
Congress’s declaration of war on Japan.77 In this context, academics—like many 
Americans—may have been willing to turn a blind eye to civil rights abuses or 
questionable government policies in the interests of winning the war. In fact, 
academics had overwhelmingly supported America’s involvement in World 
War I,78 and World War II may have been even easier to support because it was 
a war against fascism; the government was not busy targeting groups or causes 
that liberals or progressives supported, as had happened in World War I.79 
73. Murphy, Origin of Civil Liberties, supra note 61, at 174–75, 264–65.
74. Morton Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870–1960: The Crisis of Legal 
Orthodoxy 169 (Oxford Univ. Press 1994).
75. Id. at 213–14.
76. See Murphy, Constitution in Crisis Times, supra note 60, at 170–76 (noting that radicals and 
conservatives alike opposed the New Deal state, albeit for different reasons).
77. Lawrence S. Wittner, Rebels Against War: The American Peace Movement, 1941–1960 34 
(Columbia Univ. Press 1969). By contrast, the highest approval rating of the war in Iraq 
measured by CNN was 63 percent, in August of 2003; Poll: Capture boosts Americans’ 
confidence, available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/12/14/sprj.nirq.saddam.poll/index.
html.
78. Gruber, supra note 17, at 81–82; Walker, supra note 3, at 20–21.
79. Goldstein, supra note 27, at 284; Perrett, supra note 69, at 95, 358.
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Even the National Lawyers Guild, a radically progressive legal organization, 
pledged the “full support of this organization and its thousands of members to 
the successful prosecution of the war.”80 Given these circumstances, one would 
hardly expect more mainstream voices to speak up in dissent.
III. Vocal Professors and Institutional Consequences
A. Alexander Sack at New York University
To get a stronger sense for the practical consequences of the context 
described in Part I, it is useful to examine the stories of the few legal scholars 
who did speak up about aspects of U.S. policy during the war. Of these 
professors, none better illustrates the institutional weakness of tenure, and the 
financial strains of the war, than Alexander Nahum Sack.
When World War II began, Sack was a full-time professor of international 
law at New York University Law School (NYU).81 In 1940, Sack, who was 
Russian by birth, had begun writing letters to the New York Times on war-related 
topics such as neutrality, maritime warfare, and the justification for sending aid 
to Soviet Russia.82 In 1942, the newspaper published his letter arguing that the 
future of world peace depended on friendly relations with the Soviet Union 
and that communism was not an “insuperable barrier for mutual friendship” 
between Americans and the Soviets.83 Sack’s argument contained nothing 
remotely critical of U.S. policy; rather, it participated in a larger public debate 
about the Eastern European power. However, the piece’s publication provoked 
a response from a Catholic priest who obliquely criticized the professor as a 
communist apologist.84 The response outraged and offended Sack, who had 
left his native land soon after the communist revolution and now thought he 
80. Robert W. Kenney & Martin Popper, Letter to Guild Members, 2 Law. Guild Rev. 1, 1 (1942).
81. For more on the life and writings of Alexander Sack, see Sarah Ludington & Mitu Gulati, A 
Convenient Untruth: Fact and Fantasy in the Doctrine of Odious Debts, 48 Va. J. Int’l L. 
595 (2008).
82. Alexander N. Sack, Neutrality and International Law; Status of the United States in the 
Present Conflict Is Considered in the Light of Precedent, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1941, at E8; 
Alexander N. Sack, Reassertion of Our Rights on the High Seas Is Urged; Unrestricted 
Maritime Warfare Viewed as Contravening International Law and Rules To Which Even 
Nazi Germany at One Time Subscribed, N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1941, at E10; Alexander N. 
Sack, Our Aid to Russia Deemed Warranted; Aims of the Axis Against Our Form of Life 
and Resources Considered to Point Necessity, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1941, at E6. The Times 
published at least thirteen of Sack’s letters between 1940 and 1942.
83. Alexander N. Sack, Russia Viewed as Vital Factor in Winning the Peace; For All Her Size 
and Resources, She Is Regarded as in No Position to Jeopardize Her Existence by Engaging 
in a Future War of Aggression, N.Y. Times, July 26, 1942, at E6.
84. Bertrand Weaver, Our Own System Is Held Irreconcilable with Russia’s; Their Form of 
Government and Inspired Trend of Thought Viewed as Diametrically Opposed to All Our 
Long-Accepted Standards, N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1942, at E6.
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was being accused of being a communist.85 Nevertheless, the assistant dean of 
the NYU law school advised him not to reply to the letter, advice that Sack 
took.86
Four months later, NYU informed Sack that it was experiencing a financial 
emergency and that he should seek employment elsewhere for the war’s 
duration.87 This news prompted him to seek advice of independent legal 
counsel, a move that backfired dramatically. A lawyer Sack had consulted 
wrote to a member of the Board of Trustees, asking whether the opposition 
to the professor came from pro-Catholic and anti-Semitic influences in the law 
school.88 The letter was forwarded to the dean of the law school, who angrily 
instigated a hearing to “investigate” the charges, which the dean believed had 
come from Sack.89 In March, 1943, NYU fired Sack.90
In 1940, NYU employed eleven full-time professors and relied on twenty 
more part-timers to teach 808 students enrolled in its four-year degree 
program.91 Sack had taught at the school since 1933. He served two years as 
part-time faculty, then eight more full-time.92 By Fall, 1942, he was “tenured,” 
according to the rules of the AALS.93 NYU experienced a dramatic drop in 
enrollment when the war began; by 1942, its enrollment had shrunk to 307, yet 
it still employed eleven full-time faculty.94 To cope with its shrinking tuition 
income, the law school had dispensed with all but a few of its part-timers, 
encouraged older professors to retire, granted unpaid leaves of absence to 
professors so they could find employment elsewhere, and reduced the salaries 
of some of its full-timers.95 But Sack was the only full-time professor at NYU 
whose job was terminated as a result of economic distress.96
85. AALS Tentative Report In the Matter of Alexander N. Sack vs. New York University and 
New York University School of Law, Part V(c), ¶11 [hereinafter AALS Tentative Report]. 
The author was not able to find a copy of a final report in the Sack matter.
86. Id. at Part V(c), ¶55.
87. AALS Tentative Report, supra note 85, at Part V(b). The AALS submitted its tentative report 
to the parties for comment. It then referred the case to its executive committee which also 
tried, unsuccessfully, to negotiate a settlement to the dispute. Letter from Erwin N. Griswold 
to Alexander N. Sack (Sept. 11, 1945).
88. Id. at Parts V(c), ¶22.
89. Id. at Parts V(c) & VII.
90. Id. at Part III ¶1.
91. Developments in Member Schools; Statistical Information on Enrollments, 1944 AALS 
Proc. 110, 114 (1944).
92. AALS Tentative Report, supra note 85, at Part I.
93. Id. at Part II. The 1940 Statement provided that a professor was tenured after seven years of 
full-time teaching at a law school.
94. Id. at 110, 114.
95. Id. at Part V(a).
96. Id. at Part V(b) ¶7.
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Sack challenged his dismissal before the AALS Committee on Tenure. 
At the hearing, Sack was represented by Erwin Griswold—then a professor 
at Harvard Law School—who saw this case as an opportunity to make “a 
real contribution to the cause of academic freedom.”97 After the hearing, the 
committee tentatively found the termination wrongful and that NYU had 
“violated the recognized principles of academic tenure in both procedural and 
substantive respects.”98 During the hearing, the chancellor of the university 
had testified that its practice of granting yearly appointments to all full-time 
faculty was consistent with tenure standards established by the AALS and 
AAUP.99 The law school dean, however, testified that the university had “the 
absolute right to refuse to reappoint,” even in the case of full-time professors 
who had taught for fifteen years.100 This notion of tenure displeased the AALS, 
which concluded that “sound and healthy principles of tenure” had not 
permeated the “lower levels” of the university, such as the office of the dean of 
the law school.101
The AALS also was unhappy to learn that the law school routinely vetted 
Sack’s New York Times articles. In 1941, the school had created a one-member 
“Committee on Publication,” ostensibly for the purpose of “inducing” more 
faculty publications and helping with the placement of such articles.102 In 
reality, the committee was formed to supervise Sack, who thereafter was 
required to submit his articles to a faculty member—Professor Alison Reppy— 
for “editorial supervision” before sending them to the newspaper.103 While 
Sack had largely complied with the rules, the AALS concluded that the 
restrictions placed on his freedom of expression “amounted to censorship…
unsound academic practice and a clear violation of the principles of academic 
freedom.”104
Finally, the AALS concluded that NYU had used improper procedures 
in conducting a hearing into allegations of “pro-Catholic and anti-Semitic 
influences” at the school. The hearing suffered from “undefined issues, 
confused objectives, [and] the merger of judge and prosecutor,” and quickly 
“degenerat[ed] into an unfair trial of Dr. Sack.”105
97. Letter from Erwin N. Griswold to Alexander N. Sack (Aug. 5, 1944). Griswold wrote a 
personal letter to the chair of the committee after he withdrew as Sack’s counsel, expressing 
his personal belief that NYU had behaved “not only wrongfully but cruelly” towards Sack, 
and should not be given “a clean bill of health, no matter what errors Dr. Sack may make.” 
Letter from Erwin N. Griswold Griswold to Prof. James William Moore (Jan. 23, 1945).
98. Id. at Part VII.
99. Id. at Part II.
100. Id. at Part II, Discussion.
101. Id. at Part II, Discussion.
102. Id. at Part V(c), ¶6.
103. Id. at Part V(c), ¶1–5.
104. Id. at Part VI, ¶3.
105. Id. at Part V(c), ¶53. A complicating factor in his trial was Sack’s own difficult personality. 
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Despite condemning certain of NYU’s policies and procedures, the AALS 
could not save Sack’s position. The AALS criticized NYU for wrongfully firing 
Sack from a tenured position and for holding an unfair hearing into charges 
mistakenly attributed to him. It also condemned NYU for its censorious 
“Committee on Publications.” But the AALS ultimately concluded that Sack 
was fired due to severe economic strain, not in retaliation for publishing in the 
New York Times.106
Several aspects of Sack’s story are worth emphasizing. First, Sack clearly 
wanted to participate in the public discussion of war policy, and the Times 
considered his opinions worth publishing; Sack’s status as a professor of 
international law and his personal experience with the Soviet Union gave his 
opinions credibility. Sack’s success in publishing his letters confirms that a 
legal academic who wanted to comment publicly on current events could find 
a ready publisher and a wide audience.
Second, NYU obviously was anxious about Sack’s desire and ability to 
participate in public discussion of war policy. The AALS report suggests 
that NYU established its Committee on Publication specifically to deal with 
Sack. And while NYU never forbid Sack’s publishing, the mere fact of its 
publication committee would have sent a clear message that the institution 
was unhappy about his exercise of his First Amendment freedoms. Despite 
working in a climate that was unfavorable to free speech, and being actively 
discouraged from speaking up, Sack persisted in publishing at least thirteen 
pieces before losing his position.107
Third, the entire episode shows the weakness of the culture of academic 
freedom and how it probably bowed to the practical problems faced by a 
law school whose enrollment had shrunk by more than half. While Griswold 
considered the AALS Tentative Report a “great victory” for academic freedom, 
the report also can be seen as “splitting the baby;” Sack won a (barely) moral 
victory, but lost his job.108 Sack, certainly, went to his grave convinced that 
NYU had done him a great wrong.
B. Harrop Freeman at the College of William and Mary; Edwin Borchard and 
Eugene Rostow at Yale: The Japanese Internment and Legal Academics
Unlike Sack, the legal academics who publicly opposed the Japanese 
internment during the war did so without any clear institutional reprisals. 
Their number was remarkably small—three, to be exact—and is too minuscule 
Over the course of his dispute with NYU, he managed to alienate himself from the entire 
NYU law faculty and Griswold. See Ludington & Gulati, supra note 81, at 618–20; 636–37. 
Still, irascibility is not grounds for dismissal from a tenured position.
106. Id. at Part V(c), ¶13.
107. See supra note 82.
108. Letter from Erwin N. Griswold to Alexander N. Sack (Aug. 4, 1944). Sack and NYU 
ultimately settled their differences for the sum of $6,000. Agreement Between Professor 
Alexander N. Sack and New York University (June 18, 1946).
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for tenure to have been a major factor in allowing these men to speak, as 
there were hundreds of others with tenure who did not. Instead, in each of 
these cases, the professors’ personal backgrounds, strongly held beliefs, and 
employment outside the government provided the necessary conditions for 
speaking up.
While a detailed history of the internment is beyond the scope of this 
Article, it is useful to review some background. The Japanese internment 
program was set into motion soon after the United States entered World 
War II. On February 19, 1942, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt issued 
Executive Order 9066, allowing local military commanders to designate 
“military areas” as “exclusion zones,” from which “any or all persons may be 
excluded.” The military swiftly issued orders that resulted in the internment 
of 120,000 Japanese-Americans, 79,000 of whom were citizens. On March 24, 
1942, General John L. DeWitt imposed a curfew on “all enemy aliens and all 
persons of Japanese ancestry” within “Military Area No. 1,” which comprised 
the entire Pacific coast to about 100 miles inland. On the same day, he issued 
the first of many exclusion orders forcing all people of Japanese ancestry 
within Military Area No. 1 to report to assembly centers, where they would 
live until being moved to “Relocation Centers.”109
While most Japanese-Americans complied with the orders, twelve 
individuals resisted and four of their cases eventually reached the Supreme 
Court. Early in the litigation, members of the Portland bar wrote Zechariah 
Chafee at Harvard Law School to request help from the ABA Committee 
on Civil Rights110 to participate in a curfew trial as amicus curiae.111 In a 
memorandum to the chair of the ABA Committee, Chafee opined that the 
internment was part of the “inevitable hardships of war,” but carried with 
it “a real danger of abuse:” “The idea that certain American citizens can be 
singled out for special restraints on their liberty and freedom of movement 
is staggering.”112 Accordingly, he viewed judicial oversight of the internment 
as “all for the good,” and while he recommended not intervening at the trial 
level, he suggested that the committee should watch the case carefully and 
consider intervening at the appellate level.113
As the cases progressed, the ACLU provided the litigants with varying 
levels of support and representation.114 Western chapters of the ACLU were 
involved on behalf of plaintiffs Gordon Hirabayashi and Fred Korematsu 
from the beginning, but the national ACLU board split on whether and to 
what to degree to assist with the litigation.
109. Freeman, supra note 1, at 418–20.
110. See infra text accompanying notes 146–148.
111. Telegram from Robert F. Maguire to Zechariah Chafee (June 12, 1942).
112. Letter from Zechariah Chafee to Douglas Arant (June 13, 1942). 
113. Id.
114. Walker, supra note 3, at 138–39.
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In 1942, the national board voted on two litigation-related resolutions. The 
first resolution would have supported a direct constitutional challenge to the 
president’s power to issue an order removing citizens from designated military 
zones; the second, a compromise resolution, supported a more indirect attack 
on the executive order, challenging whether the government had met its 
burden of proving the necessity of evacuating all Japanese-Americans from the 
military zone.115 The compromise resolution prevailed, thanks to a coalition of 
“conservatives, liberals, and leftists” on the ACLU board who opposed any 
challenge to the president’s order. The conservatives believed they should 
defer to the executive during wartime, while the leftists similarly believed that 
successful prosecution of the war was essential because the Soviet Union, at 
that time, was carrying the burden of the war in Europe. Illustrating the split 
among liberals at the time, those who voted for the compromise believed they 
should be loyal politically to Roosevelt, were horrified by Nazism, and saw 
successful prosecution of the war as the nation’s top priority. 116
The ACLU board members who staunchly opposed the president’s order 
included committed pacifists and liberals, such as Arthur Hays and Edwin 
Borchard, who feared a concentration of power in the executive branch of 
government.117 Borchard was a tenured professor of international law at Yale 
University. He had made a name for himself as an outspoken critic of expansive 
executive authority in general (and of Roosevelt in particular), and as a “non-
interventionist” (a.k.a. isolationist) who remained critical of U.S. involvement 
in World War II even after the bombing of Pearl Harbor.118 Borchard was 
on the national board of the ACLU in the 1940s, and he voted to approve 
“resolution number 1,” which would have authorized a direct challenge to the 
validity of Executive Order 9066.119
Borchard provided nominal support for the ACLU’s litigation on behalf of 
the internees. In 1943, Hirabayashi’s attorneys approached the ACLU seeking 
the names of “distinguished counsel” who might sign on to their brief.120 Arthur 
Hays contacted Borchard, who agreed to sign on to the principal briefs for 
115. Walker, supra note 3, at 141–42.
116. Id.
117. Walker, supra note 3, at 139.
118. Justus D. Doenecke, Edwin M. Borchard, James Basset Moore, and Opposition to American 
Intervention in World War II, 6 J. Libertarian Stud. 1, 9–12, 23 (1982). For biographical 
material on Borchard, see Justus D. Doenecke, Edwin Montefiore Borchard, in Dictionary of 
American Biography, Supplement 5: 1951–55, 81–82 (5th ed., Charles Scribner 1977); Richard 
H. Kendall, Edwin M. Borchard and the Defense of Traditional American Neutrality (1961) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University).
119. Letter from Edwin M. Borchard to American Civil Liberties Union (June 13, 1942).
120. Letter from Arthur Hays to Edwin M. Borchard (May 3, 1943).
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Hirabayashi and later signed on to the ACLU amicus briefs in Korematsu and 
Ex Parte Endo.121 Borchard apparently had no other involvement with preparing 
the briefs, nor did any other legal academic.
Borchard, who at this point in his career was a distinguished professor, did 
not experience any negative institutional consequences as a result of signing 
the briefs. Like other schools, Yale Law School faced severe economic hardship 
during the war. Yale’s enrollment dropped from 386 students in 1940 to 68 in 
1944; it had employed 24 full-time teachers in 1940, but only 11 in 1944.122 For 
part of the war, the military occupied the student rooms in the law school.123
The second scholar to speak out against the internment was Herrop Freeman, 
a visiting professor at the law school of the College of William and Mary. 
He published the first war-time law journal article critical of the internment. 
The article appeared in the Cornell Law Quarterly in June, 1943, published with 
a companion piece justifying the internment.124 Freeman had just finished his 
first semester of teaching at William and Mary; he had been hired earlier that 
year to temporarily replace a professor who had entered military service.125 
In his article, Freeman argued that the executive order was unconstitutional, 
drawing support in part from the emerging doctrines of civil rights. First, 
Freeman traced the recent demise of Lochnerism (in today’s terms), and 
suggested that the individual rights of Japanese-Americans must be protected, 
even at some risk to the public generally.126 Second, he argued by analogy 
to the clear and present danger test developed in recent free speech cases, 
concluding that the danger to the public must be ‘‘‘immediate, imminent, and 
impending’” to justify such restrictions on civil liberties.127
As a visiting professor, Freeman was not protected by tenure, but apparently 
experienced no institutional reprisals for criticizing the internment; the threat 
came, instead, from outside the college. Freeman, a Quaker, was a conscientious 
121. Letter from Arthur Hays to Edwin M. Borchard (Jan. 7, 1944); Letter from Hays to Edwin 
M. Borchard (Sept. 21, 1944).
122. 1944 AALS Proceedings, supra note 18, at 113, 115.
123. Gaddis Smith, Politics and the Law School: The View from Woodbridge Hall, 1921–1963, 
as reprinted in History of the Yale Law School 138, 144 (Anthony T. Kronman ed., Yale Univ. 
Press 2004).
124. Prior articles had appeared in law reviews justifying the internment; the only other critical 
articles were either student notes or written by professors not on law faculties. See supra note 
3.
125. See supra note 22.
126. Freeman, supra note 1, at 424–30.
127. Freeman, supra note 1, at 430–33. The pedigree of the legal rule announced in Korematsu is 
evident in Freeman’s article, which relies on the writings of scholars such as Roscoe Pound, 
Herbert Wechsler, David Riesman, and Zechariah Chafee, who had previously written about 
the idea of judicial deference and balancing interests. Thus, while civil liberties were still an 
emerging field in 1942, it was possible to raise a civil liberties objection to the internment 
in terms that sound quite similar to the arguments made after Korematsu. See, e.g., Freeman, 
supra note 1, at n.45, 65, 86 & 262 (citing to scholarly articles on civil liberties).
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objector. In Summer, 1944, a local post of the American Legion wrote the 
president of the university asking him to dismiss Freeman immediately, on 
the grounds that it opposed in principle the employment of any conscientious 
objectors, regardless of ability.128
The College of William and Mary at the time had no official statement of 
academic freedom and tenure; the law school, which had been reestablished in 
1922, had been a member of the AALS only since 1936. The law school was in 
a “perilous financial” state even before the war began. It had graduated only 
28 students from 1922–1939, and was dependent for its existence on tuition and 
state funding.129 In 1944, the school reported employing two full time faculty 
and four part-timers, with a total of 24 students enrolled.130
Nevertheless, the faculty at William and Mary responded with strong 
support for Freeman, who had “proved to be a magnificent teacher and a 
very active research student of the law.”131 In a 56–1 vote, the faculty adopted 
a resolution requesting that “all appointments in all capacities be made solely 
on the merits of the appointees without respect to their religious views or other 
beliefs.”132 James Miller, the dean of faculty, informed the board that it would be 
a violation of academic freedom to dismiss Freeman or to limit the possibility 
of his reappointment.133 The president of the university recommended that 
the Board reject the demand of the American Legion as it would infringe 
Freeman’s “constitutional guarantee of liberty of conscience.”134 The Board 
of Visitors ultimately retained Freeman without making a statement about 
academic freedom or liberty of conscience; it tersely informed Post No. 39 that 
it could not dismiss Freeman because his contract did not terminate until June 
30, 1945.135
128. Resolution of Peninsula Post No. 39 of the American Legion, 1944. The Resolution also 
demanded the dismissal of Roderick Firth, a conscientious objector who had been hired to 
teach psychology.
129. Susan H. Godson, II, The College of William & Mary: A History 572–73, 587 (King and D 
Mary 1994).
130. 1944 AALS Proceedings, supra note 18, at 113, 115. Freeman was one of the full-time professors. 
Id. at 146.
131. Letter from Miller to Bohannan, supra note 22; Facts Concerning Professor Harrop Freeman 
and Dr. Roderick Firth, supra note 22.
132. Letter from W.G. Guy, Secretary of the Faculty, to J. Gordon Bohannan, Rector of the 
Board of Visitors (Sept. 29, 1944) (setting forth the text of the resolution and providing 
four reasons, including that “If such requests were granted, the College would be held up 
to ridicule and contempt as being the scene of the first World War II ‘witch hunt,’ and 
discredited in the eyes of all accrediting agencies”).
133. Letter from Miller to Bohannan, supra note 22. According to Miller, the law school dean 
was “delighted” with Freeman and had “already urged that he be given a permanent 
appointment on the faculty.” Id.
134. Recommendation of Pomfret, Oct. 7, 1944.
135. By order of the Board of Visitors of the College of William and Mary, Oct. 7, 1944. A few 
months later, Freeman became embroiled in a controversy at the school involving a student 
who wrote an editorial advocating the end of segregation. The student was dismissed 
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After Freeman, Eugene Rostow was the next legal academic to publish 
articles critical of the internment. Rostow was an assistant professor of law 
who left Yale University to work in various federal agencies during the war 
while the internment cases were being litigated. He returned to Yale in Fall, 
1944, as a tenured professor. In June, 1945—after VE day but before VJ day—
he published a denunciation of the internment in the Yale Law Journal and a 
variation of the article in The New Republic.
In several private letters, Rostow indicated that his law review article was 
to be a kind of “celebration” of his return to the freedom of legal academia. 
Rostow wrote in Fall, 1944, to a government law clerk hoping to obtain 
materials about the internment cases:
I am thinking in a dim sort of way of celebrating my return to the law by 
kicking, gouging, and otherwise assaulting the Supreme Court for its Japanese 
follies, and I should appreciate it if you could let me have any materials which 
you are unable by reason of your official position fully to exploit. If you are 
planning to get out an article in the near future on the matter, however, I shall 
gladly pick another topic on which to raise hell.136
A few months later, Rostow repeated that “I have been boiling about the 
Japanese cases ever since I came back here, and intending to celebrate my return 
to the law by tearing the court to pieces, in the classic law review manner.”137 
Rostow also apparently asked Felix Frankfurter if he would comment on 
his views of the cases; Frankfurter replied, “You may try anything on me, of 
course. But it may well be that I may not be able to respond. You have no idea 
how often I have nostalgia for the freedom I gave up and which you now again 
enjoy.”138 Rostow apparently experienced no institutional consequences from 
his criticism of the internment.
Three aspects of these stories are worth emphasizing. First, it is clear that 
both Yale and William and Mary were under severe financial pressure during 
the war, similar to NYU. But unlike NYU, Yale and William and Mary had 
strong cultures of academic freedom that had permeated the faculty and the 
administration. In Freeman’s case, the faculty and administration persuaded 
the Board of Visitors to protect Freeman (if not to take a strong stand on 
from her editorial position. President Pomfret later reported to the Board of Visitors that 
one member of the faculty had complained that Freeman had helped students organize a 
protest. The Flat Hat, Report of John E. Pomfret to the Board of Visitors, June 1, 1945, at 
3. Despite his glowing reports from the previous fall, Freeman did not receive a continuing 
appointment at William and Mary. He later joined the faculty at Cornell Law School, where 
he taught for the remainder of his career.
136. Letter from Eugene Rostow to John Frank (Oct. 6, 1944). Rostow may have used such an 
informal tone because he either knew Frank, or because Abe Fortas, whom Rostow knew, 
had directed him to write to Frank. Letter from Abe Fortas to Eugene Rostow (Sept. 26, 
1944).
137. Letter from Eugene Rostow to David Riesman (Mar. 26, 1945).
138. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Eugene Rostow (Jan. 11 1945).
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academic freedom). In the cases of Borchard and Rostow, the university 
apparently took no notice of the professors’ controversial stands. The culture 
of academic freedom was strong enough at Yale for Rostow to feel liberated 
upon his return to teaching, and to celebrate his freedom by skewering the 
Supreme Court in print.
Second, Rostow’s case underscores the significance of employment outside 
of the government. His sense of liberation at his return to academia may have 
been enhanced because he had spent the prior two years in government service, 
where he had been stewing in quiet over the internment. Herbert Wechsler’s 
experience provides a contrast to Rostow’s. As a professor at Columbia prior 
to the war, Wechsler had signed on to a brief challenging a state insurrection 
statute; while working for the Department of Justice during the war, he was 
the lead attorney in the internment cases.139
Finally, it is clear from Freeman’s example that the guarantees of tenure 
were hardly a condition for speaking out. Freeman apparently was motivated 
to write about the internment by the legal argument against it and perhaps 
his personal religious convictions. He was employed for a limited time and 
probably knew that writing a critical article might have jeopardized his 
position at the university. As a conscientious objector, however, he lived that 
risk on a daily basis.
C. Zechariah Chafee at Harvard University
Of the few legal scholars who questioned domestic policies during World 
War II, Zechariah Chafee stands out for his consistent activity. Chafee was a 
distinguished professor of law at Harvard University and an acknowledged 
expert on the First Amendment by the time World War II started. Because 
of his stature, he was approached often by litigants for help. His general 
approach to the civil liberties causes of the war was to work quietly behind the 
scenes, rather than take a public stand.
Chafee had not always been so circumspect. In the 1920s, as a relatively new 
professor at Harvard, Chafee had been “tried” by the Board of Overseers on 
charges that he had published inaccuracies in a law review article criticizing the 
trial in Abrams v. United States.140 Chafee’s “trial” was orchestrated by a number 
of Harvard alumni who objected to his criticism of the prosecutor in Abrams; 
Chafee’s reputation and job were put at stake. He was supported strongly by 
the faculty and administration of the university, with A. Lawrence Lowell, the 
139. See supra text accompanying notes 12 & 24–26.
140. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., A Contemporary State Trial—The United States versus Jacob Abrams 
et al., 33 Harv. L. Rev. 747, 747–777 (1920). Chafee also had angered various Harvard 
alumni by engaging in other public activities. For example, he criticized Justice Holmes 
and Attorney General Thomas Gregory in a 1919 law review article, and signed a petition 
criticizing the Palmer Raids. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 
Harv. L. Rev. 932, 932–73 (1919); R.G. Brown, et al., Report upon the Illegal Practices of the 
United States Department of Justice (1920). See generally Donald L. Smith, Zechariah Chafee, 
Jr.: Defender of Liberty and Law 37–57 (Harvard Univ. Press 1986) (describing Chafee’s trial 
and circumstances leading up to it).
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president of Harvard, delivering a closing argument in his defense.141 Chafee 
was narrowly acquitted of the charges.142 Harvard emerged from the trial with 
a stronger commitment to academic freedom,143 but Chafee was chastened 
by his experience; thereafter, he increasingly turned from direct and public 
criticism to scholarly commentary on civil rights, and more distanced methods 
of assisting those who had grievances against the government.144
Harvard Law School maintained its commitment to academic freedom 
and tenure during World War II. Its enrollment dropped from 1,249 in 
1940 to 162 in 1944, and it cut the rolls of full-time professors from 33 to 11.145 
Still, as previously mentioned, Erwin Griswold—one of the remaining full-
time professors at Harvard—devoted hours of his time during the war to 
representing Alexander Sack in his dispute with NYU. And Chafee—another 
of the remaining full-time professors—was actively involved with unpopular 
causes through the ABA Committee on Civil Rights. This time, there were no 
institutional reprisals for Chafee.
The ABA Committee on Civil Rights had been formed in 1939, with the 
mission of taking “a staunch and militant stand…whenever it is found that 
[the Bill of Rights is] being threatened or impaired.”146 Despite this ringing 
rhetoric, the committee was formed, in part, to regain public credibility for the 
ABA after its public efforts to oppose New Deal reforms. True to these origins, 
the committee in its early years involved itself with cases that particularly 
illustrated the dangers that a powerful government posed to the individual 
liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.147 Chafee was invited to be one of the 
original members of the committee; upon accepting the invitation he jokingly 
remarked that the public probably expected the committee to defend civil 
rights by defending against the high taxes of the New Deal.148
1. Equitable relief for internees
The ABA committee was cautious in its involvement in cases. As already 
noted, the committee declined to participate in the curfew trials in Oregon. 
At Chafee’s behest, however, the ABA Committee already was investigating 
reports that internees had been pressured to sell property at sacrifice prices 
141. Lowell was an early and passionate supporter of academic freedom, and particularly 
defended the Harvard faculty during World War I. Henry Aaron Yeomans & Walter P. 
Metzger, Abbot Lawrence Lowell, 1856–194, at 308–12 (quoting at length from Lowell’s 1916 
statement on academic freedom).
142. Smith, supra note 140, at 52–55.
143. Erwin N. Griswold, Zechariah Chafee, Jr., 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1337, 1338 (1957).
144. Smith, supra note 140, at 8-9.
145. 1944 AALS Proceedings, supra note 18, at 108, 114.
146. Frank J. Hogan, Lawyers and the Rights of Citizens, 24 A.B.A. J. 615, 617 (1938).
147. Murphy, Constitution in Crisis Times, supra note 60, at 175–76.
148. Smith, supra note 140, at 195 (quoting Letter from Zechariah Chafee to Grenville Clark (Sept. 
28, 1938)).
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before their removal. In August, 1942, the committee wrote the War Relocation 
Authority suggesting that property sold under duress might be recovered 
under the principles of equity. Chafee, who lectured in equity, offered to 
supply the legal authority for such suits.149 Soon thereafter, the War Relocation 
Authority established an Evacuee Property Board with the power, among 
other things, to reexamine the terms of completed sales.150 Chafee supplied 
a long memorandum of cases and arguments to assist the attorneys.151 In this 
instance, Chafee was not so much criticizing government policy but rather 
using the prestige of the ABA Committee to pressure the War Relocation 
Authority, and then assisting the government in mitigating the losses of the 
internees.
2. Amicus briefs on behalf of Jehovah’s Witnesses
Chafee and the ABA Committee also participated in two cases involving the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses. Although the persecution was mild compared with what 
occurred in World War I, Jehovah’s Witnesses were attacked and persecuted 
by state and local governments during World War II, particularly in the years 
between the Supreme Court’s 1940 ruling in Minersville v. Gobitis—that a local 
school district could expel children who refused to salute the flag—and the 1943 
decision that overturned it, West Virginia v. Barnette. Estimates of the numbers of 
Witnesses attacked and injured vary, but somewhere between 800 and 2,000 
Witnesses suffered beatings, kidnappings, tar and feathering, vandalism 
to their property, and even castration at the hands of angry mobs.152 There 
were less violent but serious consequences to the Witnesses’ refusal to salute 
the flag: children were expelled from school and their parents consequently 
imprisoned for delinquency and neglect; Witnesses were fired from jobs; and 
Witnesses registering for the draft were not treated as conscientious objectors 
but rather were imprisoned.153
The public was well aware of the violence, as it was reported by major 
newspapers and magazines, including The New Republic, Time, Newsweek, The Christian 
Century,154 The Saturday Evening Post,155 and in at least one scholarly journal.156 Still, 
149. Letter from Ross. L. Malone, Jr. to Director, War Relocation Authority (Aug. 6, 1942).
150. Letter from Phillip M. Glick to Zechariah Chafee (Sept. 14, 1942).
151. Letter from Phillip M. Glick to Zechariah Chafee (Oct. 15, 1942); Letter from Zechariah 
Chafee to Ross L. Malone (Oct. 28, 1942); Letter from Phillip M. Glick to Zechariah Chafee 
(Nov. 2, 1942).
152. Shawn Francis Peters, Judging Jehovah’s Witnesses: Religious Persecution and the Dawn 
of the Rights Revolution 8–10, 309 n.21 (Univ. Press of Kansas 2000); see also Goldstein, supra 
note 27, at 283–84; Perrett, supra note 69, at 91–92.
153. Peters, supra note 152, at 13; Perrett, supra note 69, at 359.
154. See generally Peters, supra note 152 (citing newspaper articles from these and other periodicals).
155. Perrett, supra note 69, at 91–92.
156. Victor Rotnem & F.G. Folsom, Recent Restrictions on Religious Liberties, 36 Am. Pol. Sci. 
Rev. 1061 (1942).
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state and local authorities did little to stop vigilante mobs (which frequently 
involved American Legion chapters), and in many instances looked the other 
way or openly assisted them. The Justice Department, though bombarded 
with complaints from Witnesses, refused to prosecute under federal civil rights 
laws. Instead, the agency issued public statements denouncing the violence.157
Whereas the Witnesses were reviled in small town America, their battles 
for religious freedom were regarded sympathetically in intellectual circles.158 
In 1939, before the war, the ABA Committee began considering whether to 
get involved with the Gobitis litigation. Another member of the Harvard law 
faculty—George Gardner, a contracts professor with an interest in civil rights—
helped Chafee convince the committee to submit a brief in Gobitis. Chafee co-
wrote the ABA Committee brief, while Gardner wrote a brief for the ACLU 
and argued on behalf of the appellants.159 After the decision, Chafee and other 
scholars—including two on law faculties—roundly criticized Frankfurter’s 
majority opinion.160 In 1943, Chafee wrote the brief submitted by the ABA 
Committee in Barnette.161 By this time, Gardner was on war-time leave from the 
Harvard faculty and did not participate in the case.162
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Minn. L. Rev. 29 (1944) (Waite was a retired state judge).
159. Smith, supra note 140, at 202–04.
160. See, e.g., Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States 405 (Harvard Univ. Press 
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(professor of political science at Cornell University); Beryl H. Levy, Our Constitution: Tool 
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161. Smith, supra note 140, at 209–12.
162. 1943 AALS Proc., supra note 19, at 91.
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The Witnesses’ persistent recourse to the courts during World War 
II resulted in several cases that made their way to the high court and are 
foundational in free speech and civil rights law. For example, the Supreme 
Court carved out a “fighting words” exception to free speech doctrine in 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,163 a case involving a Witness who resisted arrest, 
and ruled in Jones v. Opelika164 that a city could not impose a peddler’s tax 
on Witnesses for distributing literature. Chafee and Gardner were the only 
law professors who directly contributed to these landmark civil rights cases 
involving Jehovah’s Witnesses.
3. Moral support for the defendants in the Great Sedition Trial
Chafee also was approached for help by numerous defendants in the Great 
Sedition Trial, yet his assistance to them extended no further than private 
opposition to the proceeding and the doctrinal aid provided in his treatise on 
free speech.
The far-right opposition to World War II was, for the most part, tiny 
and marginalized. Still, American fascists were vocal and persistent in their 
criticism of Roosevelt and the war. Popular opinion strongly supported legal 
action, and Roosevelt soon began to pressure Attorney General Frank Biddle 
to silence the fascist fringe.165 In March, 1942, the federal government indicted 
Walter Pelley, known as the “American Hitler,” for sedition.166
Four months later, the Justice Department brought a second sedition 
indictment against a motley group of lesser-known American fascists.167 
The indictment brought 28 defendants from various parts of the country to 
Washington, D.C., where—after two years and two superseding indictments—
they were tried for conspiracy to “cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, 
and refusal of duty” in the armed forces.168 The trial went slowly as the more 
flamboyant defendants used the proceedings as a bully pulpit for their 
causes, and it became increasingly clear that the government had no evidence 
of contact between the defendants and a foreign power, or even of contact 
between the various defendants. A mistrial was declared when the presiding 
judge died of a heart attack shortly after the prosecution rested its case. By 
then, the war was all but over and prosecutors declined to renew the charges.169
163.  15 U.S. 568 (1942).
164.  319 U.S. 103 (1943).
165. Steele, supra note 36, at 143–44, 151–52; Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times: Free Speech in 
Wartime 256–58 (W. W. Norton & Co. 2004).
166. Steele, supra note 36, at 206–07; see also Stone, supra note 165, at 258–72 (discussing Pelley, his 
trial, and conviction).
167. Stone, supra note 165, at 272–73.
168. Indictment at 25, United States v. Winrod (D.D.C. July 23, 1942).
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The indicted war critics were widely regarded as pariahs and reviled for 
their anti-Semitic, pro-fascist rhetoric. They struggled, unsurprisingly, to find 
legal representation. The ACLU was riven on the issue; the same coalition that 
had limited ACLU involvement in the Japanese internment cases successfully 
blocked the group from participating in the defense of the sedition trial, 
adopting a policy of not assisting sedition defendants who may have been 
aiding the enemy.170
Chafee received numerous letters from defendants and others begging him 
for legal assistance. He took the appeals to the ABA Committee but it refused 
to get involved.171 Chafee, in turn, declined to offer his individual assistance. In 
his correspondence with the defendants, he gave various reasons: his teaching 
duties; his preference, as an academic, to allow practitioners to handle trials 
and to observe legal matters for some time before becoming directly involved; 
and his desire to “let my book speak for me.” His letters invariably are kind, 
indicating he is “troubled” by the nature of the prosecution and expressing his 
hope that the defendants are “represented by competent counsel” and will be 
able to “properly present” their cases.172
In other correspondence, Chafee criticized the indictment more harshly. 
In a private letter to an ACLU attorney, he described it as “indefensible.”173 
In a letter to Burton Wheeler, an anti-interventionist senator from Montana 
who had publicly attacked the indictment and written to Chafee for his 
thoughts, the professor wrote that he had been “considerably disturbed” by 
the indictment and that “many of the utterances charged seem to me not worth 
bothering about, although the tone of some of these was very distasteful to 
me.”174 Burton repeated Chafee’s criticism of the indictments to the press,175 
and, thus, Chafee inadvertently became the only legal academic to publicly 
criticize the sedition trial. While he clearly intended to keep his views on the 
170. Walker, supra note 3, at 155–57; see supra text accompanying notes 115–116.
171. See, e.g., Letter from Zechariah Chafee to Edward James Smythe (Feb. 18, 1943); Letter from 
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Daily Tribune, Feb. 4, 1943, at 4.
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matter out of the press,176 he received at least one letter of gratitude from a 
defendant, who stated that Chafee alone, through the statement made public 
by Wheeler and his writings on free speech, had done more for the defendants 
than the entire bar and legal academy.177 Indeed, a letter to Chafee from one 
attorney in the trial indicated that over the two years of proceedings in the 
case, his book had “been in the hands not only of counsel but also of the trial 
judges.”178
One scholar has obliquely chided Chafee’s lack of involvement with the 
sedition trial, attributing his passivity to the unpopularity of the defendants, 
Chafee’s increased age, his chastening by his trial at Harvard, or his indifference 
to the relatively small scale of repression in World War II.179 But Chafee still 
was clearly willing to offer his personal assistance when he considered the cause 
compelling. In July, 1942, he wrote Kenneth Royall and Cassius Dowell—the 
military lawyers assigned to defend eight German saboteurs apprehended on 
U.S. soil—to offer his personal assistance with the trial. Royall thanked him 
for his offer, noting that “[n]umerous attempts to obtain civilian counsel were 
unsuccessful. In fact, you were the only one who expressed a willingness to go 
ahead under any conditions; and we were unable to get anyone to join you.”180
IV. Conclusion—A Culture of Silence
In 1946, the Committee on Tenure of the American Association of Law 
Schools (AALS) reported an “unruffled” year:
Not only has its record been entirely free of fresh complaints involving tenure 
of teachers in member schools, but the difficult outstanding case mentioned 
by this [c]ommittee’s report for 1944…has come to a satisfactory termination 
by settlement.181
Professor John M. Maguire, the committee’s chair, ventured two reasons 
for its “clear docket:” that professors were enjoying a sellers’ market, and that 
schools had instituted rules and procedures for the “just and satisfactory” 
resolution of tenure disputes.182 As anecdotal evidence that law schools were 
176. Letter from Zechariah Chafee to H.B. Elliston, Esq. (Feb. 6, 1943) (emphasizing that his 
written remarks to Senator Burton were “not for publication”).
177. Letter from Ralph Townsend to Zechariah Chafee (Sept. 11, 1943).
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committed to putting in systems for tenure dispute resolution, Maguire noted 
that “probably less than 1 percent” of the nearly 600 tenure disputes brought 
before the AAUP in the past decade had involved law schools.183
In fact, during the four years of America’s involvement in World War II, the 
AALS Committee on Tenure handled only two tenure disputes, one of which 
was Sack’s.184 Maguire’s optimistic assessment of the lack of tenure disputes in 
law schools thus raises the question whether law schools were in fact strongly 
committed to the academic freedom and tenure of their faculty in the early 
1940s, or whether war-time faculty had believed that it was wiser to keep one’s 
head down and mouth shut rather than take a chance on the fair-mindedness 
of the administration.
As shown here, a number of historical factors contributed to pressure the 
legal academy into staying quiet about policy matters during World War II. 
The national mood strongly favored the war, law schools faced dire economic 
hardship and many professors had found a paycheck elsewhere—often in the 
service of the government. Those few professors who remained in teaching 
had a strong incentive not to stir up any controversy, as they would have felt 
lucky to have kept their positions. Further, the doctrinal flux of the early 1940s 
contributed to this culture of silence. Civil rights had not yet developed into 
a separate field of study, and despite Chafee’s groundbreaking work, the First 
Amendment was still emerging as a viable legal defense. These factors would 
have made it seem extremely risky for a professor to speak up or advocate on 
behalf of an unpopular group.
The one factor that might have strengthened the resolve of law professors 
to continue acting as public intellectuals during the war was the newly 
adopted commitment to academic freedom and tenure at AALS-member law 
schools. However, it is unclear that the 1940 statement did much to promote 
detached, critical commentary by law professors, especially in the face of such 
severe economic pressure. For one thing, the respect for tenure and academic 
freedom was too fragile in some institutions, as at NYU Law School; further, 
an institution could plausibly point to severe economic strain to justify any 
firing, even of a tenured professor, as happened to Alexander Sack.
On the other hand, several law schools maintained a robust culture of 
academic freedom, despite economic hardship. The financially teetering 
William and Mary strongly protected a visiting (untenured) professor from 
attack based on his conscientious objector status. Harvard and Yale were home 
to the highest number of tenured professors—three—who remained engaged 
with public policy issues during the war. Eugene Rostow celebrated his return 
to Yale by engaging in a full-throttle attack on the Japanese internment cases; 
183. Id.
184. See Report of the Executive Committee, 1945 AALS Proc. 99 (1945). This author has been 
unable to locate any records concerning the substance of the other dispute, which involved a 
law professor at the University of Missouri Kansas City School of Law. Report of Committee 
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clearly, he felt more empowered to criticize the government from Yale than he 
had while working for the Lend-Lease Administration. Still, it is difficult to 
draw any strong conclusions about the influence of tenure on academic speech 
during the war as the sample set of outspoken professors is so small.
Those who worked in private practice rather than in academia were probably 
better situated to comment on domestic policy during the war—provided 
that they did not alienate clientele by advocating on behalf of unpopular 
groups—making the contribution of groups such as the ACLU and the ABA 
Committee on Civil Rights so important in litigating on behalf of the interned 
Japanese-Americans and Jehovah’s Witnesses. But splits and divisions among 
these groups, and at times a wavering commitment to First Amendment 
freedoms, restrained their advocacy. And when the ACLU and ABA refused to 
act, professors like Borchard and Chafee, who otherwise might have assisted 
them, kept out of the fray.
This small cadre of vocal professors were, by modern observation, outsiders 
in the white, male academy of the day; Rostow, Borchard and Sack were Jewish; 
Sack was foreign-born, and Freeman was a conscientious objector. However, 
identity politics does not fully explain their willingness to speak up, as Chafee 
was well within the mainstream, even before he expressed divergent views in 
World War I. Further, other Jewish and foreign-born professors who remained 
on law faculties chose not to comment on the war. Finally, Sack—who perhaps 
qualifies as the most “outside” of the four—was probably the least critical of the 
government in his speech.
The contrast between the culture of silence in the legal academy of World 
War II and the legal academy of today could not be starker. The response of 
law professors to the war on terror has been public, voluminous, disseminated 
in the academic and popular media alike, and overwhelmingly critical. Yet not 
one tenured professor has lost his position after voicing an opinion on the war 
on terror.
The sheer volume of the academic commentary on the war on terror has 
been extraordinary, and so it is unsurprising that this body of work can be 
criticized for being facile, or representing nothing more than a ritualized or 
“safe” form of dissent. But the outpouring of academic literature has served 
the important purpose of providing a safe space or cover for the publication 
of the most trenchant and controversial critiques—in the words of Margulies 
and Metcalf, those rare articles that “forcefully” examine “the continuities 
between post-9/11 policies and American practices and attitudes toward crime, 
risk, security and socially constructed ‘[o]thers.’” Furthermore, to pan the 
general quality of the academic literature on the war is not to accuse it of being 
futile, or to argue that the criticism and attention from the legal academy went 
unnoticed by the public and the courts, or had no effect in checking abusive 
executive policies. Quite the contrary, it seems to have had a demonstrable 
effect on the unpopularity of the Bush Administration.
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As we look back on the history of legal education in the United States, 
it is remarkable and admirable that any academics dared to speak and write 
about controversial domestic policy events during World War II, given the 
pressures not to. While the basic building blocks of the legal academy remain 
the same today as they were in World War II, other factors such as strong 
institutional commitments to academic freedom and tenure, a robust First 
Amendment, and economic prosperity have significantly changed the roles 
that law professors do—and should—play in society, most significantly as the 
watchdogs of government.
